Exploration of the Bengal Famine to Support the Sub-Intervention
Reviewing a recent book, The Churchill Factor, by London Mayor Boris Johnson, a reviewer repeated a widespread canard about Winston Churchill that really needs to be put to rest:
The Bengal famine of 1943 was a major famine of the Bengal province in British India during World War II. An estimated 3 million, out of a population of 60 million, died of starvation, or of malaria and other diseases aggravated by malnutrition, population displacement, unsanitary conditions and lack of health care. Millions were impoverished, as the crisis overwhelmed large segments of the economy and social fabric. Historians have frequently characterised the famine as "man-made", asserting that wartime colonial policies created and then exacerbated the crisis.
Much of Bengal's market supplies and transport systems were disrupted by British "denial policies" for rice and boats (a "scorched earth" response to the occupation). The British government also pursued prioritised distribution of vital supplies to the military, civil servants and other "priority classes". These factors were compounded by restricted access to grain: domestic sources were constrained by emergency inter-provincial trade barriers, while access to international sources was largely denied by Churchill's War Cabinet, arguably due to a wartime shortage of shipping. The British government's policy failures began with denial that a famine even existed.
Those which assert that the Churchill government willfully caused or ignored the plight of starving Indians argue that the Bengal famine was a conscious miscarriage of justice by the "ruling colonial elite" who abandoned the poor of Bengal. A related argument, present since the days of the famine but expressed at length by Mukerjee (2010), accuses key figures in the British government (particularly Prime Minister Winston Churchill) of genuine antipathy toward Indians and Indian independence—an antipathy arising mainly from a desire to protect imperialist privilege, but tinged also with racist undertones.
Winston Churchill, the hallowed British War prime minister who saved Europe from a monster like Hitler was disturbingly callous about the roaring famine that was swallowing Bengal’s population. He casually diverted the supplies of medical aid and food that was being dispatched to the starving victims to the already well supplied soldiers of Europe. When entreated upon, he said, “Famine or no famine, Indians will breed like rabbits.” The Delhi Government sent a telegram to him painting a picture of the horrible devastation and the number of people who had died. His only response was, “Then why hasn’t Gandhi died yet?".
This case study, that became the focus of our sub-intervention, reveals that nostalgia for war victory, nationalistic nostalgia and national pride can have a hugely negative impact on the accuracy or reliability of our historical cultural narratives. Churchill is celebrated in such a way that his war crimes are effectively scratched from the record. Nostalgia can effect our sense of objectivity and thus, the morality of our politics.
By Kat
"When there was a danger of serious famine in Bengal in 1943–4, Churchill announced that the Indians “must learn to look after themselves as we have done… there is no reason why all parts of the British empire should not feel the pinch in the same way as the mother country has done.” Still more disgracefully, he said in a jocular way that “the starvation of anyhow underfed Bengalis is less serious than that of sturdy Greeks.” This is more than amusingly politically incorrect language: it had real consequences. Three million Bengalis died of starvation. A true historian would not have neglected this in order to suggest that the imperialist was making a stand against ‘barbarous practices.”
The Bengal famine of 1943 was a major famine of the Bengal province in British India during World War II. An estimated 3 million, out of a population of 60 million, died of starvation, or of malaria and other diseases aggravated by malnutrition, population displacement, unsanitary conditions and lack of health care. Millions were impoverished, as the crisis overwhelmed large segments of the economy and social fabric. Historians have frequently characterised the famine as "man-made", asserting that wartime colonial policies created and then exacerbated the crisis.
Much of Bengal's market supplies and transport systems were disrupted by British "denial policies" for rice and boats (a "scorched earth" response to the occupation). The British government also pursued prioritised distribution of vital supplies to the military, civil servants and other "priority classes". These factors were compounded by restricted access to grain: domestic sources were constrained by emergency inter-provincial trade barriers, while access to international sources was largely denied by Churchill's War Cabinet, arguably due to a wartime shortage of shipping. The British government's policy failures began with denial that a famine even existed.
Those which assert that the Churchill government willfully caused or ignored the plight of starving Indians argue that the Bengal famine was a conscious miscarriage of justice by the "ruling colonial elite" who abandoned the poor of Bengal. A related argument, present since the days of the famine but expressed at length by Mukerjee (2010), accuses key figures in the British government (particularly Prime Minister Winston Churchill) of genuine antipathy toward Indians and Indian independence—an antipathy arising mainly from a desire to protect imperialist privilege, but tinged also with racist undertones.
The Evidence
The Bengal famine of 1943 was the only one in modern Indian history not to occur as a result of serious drought, according to a study that provides scientific backing for arguments that Churchill-era British policies were a significant factor contributing to the catastrophe. Researchers in India and the US used weather data to simulate the amount of moisture in the soil during six major famines in the subcontinent between 1873 and 1943. Soil moisture deficits, brought about by poor rainfall and high temperatures, are a key indicator of drought. In late 1943, thought to be the peak of the famine, rain levels were above average, said the study published in February in the journal Geophysical Research Letters. “This was a unique famine, caused by policy failure instead of any monsoon failure,” said Vimal MishraInvestigating Churchill
"I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion. The famine was their own fault for breeding like rabbits." -Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill, the hallowed British War prime minister who saved Europe from a monster like Hitler was disturbingly callous about the roaring famine that was swallowing Bengal’s population. He casually diverted the supplies of medical aid and food that was being dispatched to the starving victims to the already well supplied soldiers of Europe. When entreated upon, he said, “Famine or no famine, Indians will breed like rabbits.” The Delhi Government sent a telegram to him painting a picture of the horrible devastation and the number of people who had died. His only response was, “Then why hasn’t Gandhi died yet?".
This case study, that became the focus of our sub-intervention, reveals that nostalgia for war victory, nationalistic nostalgia and national pride can have a hugely negative impact on the accuracy or reliability of our historical cultural narratives. Churchill is celebrated in such a way that his war crimes are effectively scratched from the record. Nostalgia can effect our sense of objectivity and thus, the morality of our politics.
By Kat
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